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This thesis engages the work of Reinhart Koselleck and in particular his notion of historical 
time(s) in an effort to understand how the scholarly and popular historiography with regard to 
Turkey’s Ottoman past have changed since the foundation of the Republic. Focusing especially 
on the present representations of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), a contentious figure who is 
increasingly recognized to be the face of the Ottoman Empire, it attempts to provide fragments 
from the newly emerging narrative of history which reimagines contemporary Turkey as a nation 
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 Sultan Abdülhamid II, who reigned between 1876 and 1909 in the Ottoman Empire, is 
one of the most controversial figures in the history of modern Turkey. He and his reign were 
often constructed as the “other’’ by the ruling elite during the early republican period. For the 
Young Turks, who deposed Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1909 and eventually played a role in the 
foundation of Turkey, the Sultan was a violent, suppressive despot, holding the empire hostage to 
his absolutist and Islamic practices. Modernization theorists and followers conveyed his regime 
as an aberration, one that stands in the way of progress, which to them was equated with 
Europeanization of the Ottoman Empire. As the “official discourse”, this negative portrayal of 
the Sultan persisted throughout much of the twentieth century with some minor challenges to it 
beginning to emerge in the 1960’s. This revised history was mostly promoted by the rising voices 
of Islamists,1 who criticized the Europeanization policies of the early Kemalist republic as well 
as his intellectual western supporters. Instead, they posited Sultan Abdülhamid II as a reformer 
and his reign as a continuity of the Tanzimat era that started in the early 19th century.  Although 
the official Kemalist depiction of Abdülhamid II as a reactionary Muslim autocrat continued to 
be hegemonic in this period, the new interpretation of him as a Turco-Muslim hero nonetheless 
began to gain popularity within “Islamist” intellectual circles. But it was only when the Justice 
and Development Party (AK Party) came to power in 2002 that this revised narrative was 
consolidated through initiated policies that reinforced the reimagining of contemporary Turkey 
as a nation in a continuous dialogue with its Islamic past and possible futures.
                                                 




This thesis engages the work of Reinhart Koselleck and in particular his notion of 
historical time(s)2. I argue that temporality is essential for understanding the past as the 
experience of time by people has not been constant, but subjected to transformation throughout 
history. In antiquity, for example, time was experienced cyclical as an expression of the natural 
life and the pace of change was slow. “Precisely because nothing fundamentally new would 
arise, it was quite possible to draw conclusions from the past for the future.”3 With the rise of 
Judaism and Christianity, the idea of a goal in the future (which was the second coming of the 
Christ as well as redemption) was introduced, paving the way for the development of a concept 
that would later be called progress. As Koselleck argues in The Practice of Conceptual History 
(2002), between 1750 and 1850, however, the idea of time underwent a transformation (by the 
way of acceleration) due to the changing subjectivity of people. While the scientific and 
technological novelties brought about revolutionary changes one after another,4 people came to 
perceive themselves as the engine of an infinite and unidirectional progress. According to 
Koselleck, it was when the experience of a new time began to be discerned. While “a future that 
transcended the hitherto predictable’’5 came to be recognized, an ever-increasing gap between 
the expectations and all the previous experience emerged.6 Hence, “historical experience 
descending from the past could no longer be directly extended to the future.”7 The past was seen 
to have lost its significance and relevance vis-à-vis the present and future.  
                                                 
2 See Reinhart Koselleck, ‘’Author’s Preface’’ in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004).  
3 Koselleck, Futures Past, 197. 
4 Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), 5. 
5 Koselleck, Futures Past, 22. 
6 Ibid, 223. 
7 Ibid, 268. 
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In this light, I argue that for the Young Turks during the late Ottoman Empire as well as 
the ruling elite during the early republican period, the experience of present time, as linear and 
progressive, made the alienation of the immediate past necessary. During the first decades of the 
republic, the political elite that carved a Turkish nation and state out of the Ottoman Empire 
looked at the possibilities of a novel and better future which could only be achieved through a 
commitment to the ideal of progress. In order to achieve this progress, they thought, the past had 
to be abandoned for the future. However, today, I suggest that the hegemony of the idea of 
unidirectional progression in time (towards the perfection of life and humans) has been broken.8 
The unknown future is no longer privileged unconditionally over against the past contributing to 
the change of attitude towards the Ottoman past and the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II in Turkey.  
 In everyday life, TV series, popular history books and daily newspapers continue to 
reinterpret Sultan Abdülhamid II and his reign, attributing new meanings to his name and deeds. 
He is mostly commemorated as the last authentic Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Perceived to 
have demonstrated an extraordinary resistance to European imperialists, zionists and their 
collaborators inside the empire during his reign, he is cast as one of the most significant figures 
in the history of modern Turkey. What is even more striking is the fact that Abdülhamid’s name 
and reign is being promoted by the Turkish state for the first time. Commemoration ceremonies 
and conferences are regularly organized with the support of the state to honor his legacy. Each 
public event reconstructs the collective memory, bringing about a new historical consciousness 
that does not negate Turkey its Islamic past and present. In this process, Sultan Abdülhamid II 
appears to be the face of the Ottoman Empire while Turkey is recognized as the continuity of the 
Ottoman Empire. Correspondingly, the Sultan is reimagined as one of the founding fathers of the 
                                                 
8 It is my contention that postmodernism which allowed for the crticism of the project of modernity is a factor for 
the weakening of the hegemony of the idea of unidirectional progression in time. 
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country, standing increasingly side by side with, if not replacing, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the 
founder of the Republic.  
 The effort to rehabilitate the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II is dramatically noticed in the 
state-financed multi-billion dollar construction projects transforming the public space in Istanbul 
as a concrete display of enforcing this revised vision of the Ottoman past and of the Sultan in 
particular. One need to emphasize that all these construction projects are primarily located in 
Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, the cosmopolitan city that has been neglected since 
the rise of the early republic that has taken Ankara as its capital in 1923. The relocation of state 
power to Ankara, as Alev Çınar points out, corresponded to the establishment of a new Turkish 
state and nation which were “being founded upon new norms that celebrated Turkish 
nationalism, in contrast to an Ottoman identity.’’9 Ankara was this clean slate on which a new 
secular political system looking to West could be built as an alternative to Istanbul, the cradle of 
an Islamic East.10 The republic’s investment in Ankara was reversed in the 1980s when the 
political elite began the process of integration to the global financial markets by bringing an end 
to the state led import-substitution industrialization model that had been pursued since the 
1930’s. That is when Istanbul regained its value as a global and cosmopolitan city.11 In fact, 
today Istanbul is recognized as the financial, cultural and historical capital of Turkey.  The AK 
Party has contributed to that by its heavy investments in this mega-city through the monumental 
construction projects that happened to transform the spatial character of the city. This investment, 
I argue, is instrumental in the redefinition of Turkey’s modern identity as Ottoman. But as I will 
argue here, this massive support of the AK party line did not preclude opposition, especially by 
                                                 
9 Alev Çınar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey Bodies, Places, and Time (Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of 
Minnesota Press, 2008), 85. 
10 Çağlar Keyder, Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 19.  
11 Keyder, Istanbul, 22. 
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those who continue to support the Kemalist early republican project. Thus turning these 
construction projects that hold symbolic and economic importance for the country into places of 
political contestation over the meaning of Turkish identity.  This broad-based struggle is waged 
not only for the sake of reshaping the collective memory pertaining to the country's pre-nation 
state past but also for defining the political, social and cultural characteristics of its living present 
and anticipated future(s). In other words, it constitutes a process in which different groups come 
to negotiate with regard to the basic principles of the state and the society in Turkey today.12  
II. Emergence of Sultan Abdülhamid II as an Islamic and Turkish hero 
 Sultan Abdülhamid II ascended the throne in 1876 after the deposition of his brother 
Murad V, due to the rapid deterioration of the latter’s mental state ending in a nervous 
breakdown in his short reign of three months.13 Abdülhamid II promulgated the first Ottoman 
constitution, oversaw the first Ottoman elections and the opening of the first Ottoman parliament 
in the following two years. In 1878, he ended the constitutional era and “ruled as an absolute 
monarch for 30 years.’’14 As Eric Jan Zürcher points out, his reign was the subject of great 
controversy during and after his rule. In the nineteenth century, Europeans saw him as a 
bloodthirsty and reactionary tyrant,15 giving him names such as “Red Sultan’’ or “Abdul the 
Damned.’’16 The violent repression of the Armenians in the 1890s was effective in the formation 
of this negative portrayal.17 However, his bad reputation was neither limited to his personality 
nor to the later period of his reign. As Caroline Finkel points out, as early as 1876, Sultan 
                                                 
12 Some journalists, politicians and scholars use the term “New Turkey’’ to describe the transformation of Turkey 
under the rule of the AK Party.  
13 Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 73. 
14 Zürcher, Turkey, 76. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Caroline Finkel, Osmans Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923 (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 
574.  
17 Zürcher, Turkey, 76. 
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Abdülhamid and his people were declared “one of the great anti-human specimens of humanity’’ 
in Europe,18 which reflected the prevailing Orientalist thought at that time. It was not only 
Europeans of the nineteenth century but also some of Abdülhamid’s subjects, the Young Turks, 
who would eventually force the Sultan from power in 1909, considered him a reactionary figure 
holding them back in their struggle for progress of the empire. Later, the notions of the Young 
Turks were taken up by the historians of the Turkish Republic.19  
 The negative portrayal of Abdülhamid II dominated the literature through much of the 
twentieth century. As Claudia Kleinert demonstrates, Turkish historians’ depictions of 
Abdülhamid II have served to define their political positions with regard to contemporary 
Turkey.20 Until recent decades, most Turkish scholars avoided conducting research on 
Abdülhamid’s reign as it was a contentious subject21 and the ones who did write about it held 
negative views. This attitude, according to Chowdhury, was a way to pledge allegiance to the 
new regime founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.22 On the contrary, expressing admiration for the 
Sultan was an effective way of challenging the secular/nation state order that was officially 
adopted with the foundation of the Republic in 1923. This literature on the Hamidian era started 
to change in the 1960s as historians and intellectuals of Turkey, both from inside and outside of 
the country, published works in which Abdülhamid II was interpreted differently compared to 
during the early republican period.  
                                                 
18 Finkel, Osmans Dream, 574. 
19 Zürcher, Turkey, 77. 
20 Erik Jan Zürcher, “Bibliographical Section A: Review Article: The Ottoman Twilight”, British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 27, no. 2 (2000): 201-07. 
21 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu and Selim Deringil, “The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in 
the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909”, The American Historical Review 105, no. 1 (2000): 319-320.  
22 Rashed Chowdhury, ‘’Pan Islamism and Modernisation During the Reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II 1876-1909’’ 
(Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 2011), 29. 
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 Previously dismissed as an anti-Tanzimat man, Sultan Abdülhamid II began to be 
recognized as a vigorous modernizer. In The Emergence of Modern Turkey (1961), Bernard 
Lewis, a leading Orientalist, reinterpreted Sultan Abdülhamid II as a proponent of the Tanzimat 
reforms, thereby challenging the general opinion that he was an anti-Tanzimat figure.23 Lewis 
underlined that during the reign of the Sultan, the whole Tanzimat movement, which consisted of 
reforms that transformed the legal, administrative and educational structure in the Ottoman 
Empire, “reached its fruition and its climax.’’24 Lewis nonetheless undermined Abdülhamid as a 
despot for his illiberal views.  
 Though he was an active modernizer, for Lewis, Sultan Abdülhamid II had “no sympathy 
for liberalism and democracy.’’25 Lewis considered the Sultan to be “purely cynical and 
opportunistic’’26 with regard to the reforms undertaken in his reign. Lewis’ chapter on the 
struggle between the Sultan and the Young Turks was titled “Despotism and Enlightenment’’, 
which makes his dichotomous analysis clear by presenting the Sultan as the symbol of 
“despotism’’ and the Young Turks as the symbol of “enlightenment’’. Lewis did not approve of 
the Sultan's pan-Islamic policies, which reflected the continuity of centuries-old Orientalist ideas. 
When he elaborated about the construction of railways during the reign of Abdülhamid II, for 
example, Lewis wrote that:  
The name (of the Orient Express) reflected the viewpoint of the Europeans who planned, 
built and operated it – but for a whole new generation of Turks it was the express to 
Europe, and the Sirkeci railway terminus in Istanbul the ante-room to freedom and 
modernity. A move in the opposite direction was symbolized by the Hejaz Railway, 
linking Damascus to Medina (emphasis mine).27  
 
                                                 
23 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 178. 
24 Lewis, Modern Turkey, 179. 
25 Ibid, 167. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Lewis, Modern Turkey, 185. 
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Here, Lewis drew on a dichotomous representation of Europe as modern and democratic in 
contrast to a despotic East. In that regard, Hejaz railway, which was paid for by donations from 
Muslims all over the world was meant to promote the Sultan’s pan-Islamic aspirations rather than 
a genuine attempt at modernization.28  
 Abdülhamid’s portrayal as a “reactionary’’ and “obscurantist’’ figure who delayed the 
process of westernization was also advocated Turkish scholars. Personally invested in the 
Kemalist project of the early Republic, Niyazi Berkes defined Sultan Abdülhamid's reign with 
one word: reaction. In The Development of Secularism in Turkey 29 (1964), Berkes categorizes 
this era as a reactionary one due to the Sultan's defense of what was considered old and 
traditional. Analyzing the period between 1878 and 1908, he argued that with Abdülhamid II, 
“Turkey lapsed into a long period of reaction and isolation.’’30 Anti-westernism, according to 
Berkes, became the major component of policies implemented by Abdülhamid II due to feeling 
betrayed by Europe.31 As a result of these policies, “an unbridgeable gulf between the two 
worlds’’ was created.32 Moreover, the Sultan supported his anti-western views, according to 
Berkes, by “the cultivation of an attachment to the past and to the old’’33 and by fostering 
everything that “preserved, glorified, and justified tradition.’’34 This was the reason why 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Berkes’ book is titled in Turkish “Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma”. “Çağdaşlaşma’’ means becoming civilized in English. 
In the English edition of the book, the word “Çağdaşlaşma’’ is replaced by the word secularism, which demonstrates 
that the writer equates civilization with secularism.  
30 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 250. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, 261. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Berkes, Secularism in Turkey, 256. 
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Abdülhamid II was deemed an “obscurantist’’35 and his reign “a magic spell of regime that no 
one who might be called intelligent remained immune to.’’36 
 An Islamist intellectual of the Republic and a staunch critic of the Kemalist 
modernization project, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was a prominent figure among the first generation 
of writers who challenged the mainstream depiction of Abdülhamid II as a “reactionary’’ and 
“traditional’’ figure. Kısakürek’s book The Great Emperor Abdulhamid Khan (1965) constituted 
a turning point for the rehabilitation of the Sultan’s image. Kısakürek was not a historian and he 
acknowledged this fact from the outset by underlining that his work was rather that of a thinker. 
37 As Edhem Eldem pointed out, Kısakürek’s motive was not to provide a scholarly revision of 
the Hamidian period but to “stab at the monolithic narrative that the Kemalist regime was 
imposing upon the Turkish nation.’’38 Kısakürek, in fact, wounded the “official’’ discourse, if I 
may continue to use Eldem’s metaphor, by characterizing Abdülhamid as a “great emperor” and 
giving him the Turko-Mongol honorific title of Khan. He claimed that the “official’’ view of 
Abdülhamid II was first produced by what he called the “arch nemesis of the Sultan’’, i.e. the 
Young Turks, with “the help of Jews and imperialists.’’39 Neglecting the internal and external 
circumstances of that time, he referred to the Sultan’s restriction of Jewish settlement in Palestine 
as the main cause of his dethronement and thereby contributed to the circulation of conspiracy 
theories within Islamist circles that constructed Jews as the most powerful enemy of Muslims. 
Declaring that the “official’’ history was “untrue’’, Kısakürek claimed to have written his piece in 
order to reveal the hidden “truth’’ about Abdülhamid II and wrote that: 
                                                 
35 Ibid, 259. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Ulu Hakan: II. Abdulhamid Han (Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 2003), 5. 
38 Edhem Eldem, “Sultan Abdülhamid II: Founding Father of the Turkish State?’’, Journal of the Ottoman and 
Turkish Studies Association 5, no. 2 (2018): p.28. 
39 Kısakürek, Ulu Hakan, 4. 
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Abdülhamid II should no longer be denied as a great savior. His authentic nature as the 
essence and foundation of the Turks has been damaged by certain usurpers ... [He is] the 
last stand against the unthinking imitation of the West, [a ruler] who remained loyal to the 
root sources of the Turks’ spirit.40 
 
 It would not be an exaggeration to say that Kısakürek paved the way for the later 
reinterpretation of the Sultan in the political arena, especially from the 1980s when political 
Islamists started to gain moderate power in Turkey. Kısakürek was among the first to challenge 
the mainstream historiography regarding Abdülhamid II; however, his work fell well short of a 
historical redemption. Indeed, by only glorifying the Sultan, he portrayed an image that was the 
exact opposite of the “official’’ discourse at the time. In effect, he took the Abdülhamid II 
narrative from one extreme to the other. This was later followed by more nuanced studies of the 
Sultan and the late Ottoman Empire.  
 By the late 1990s, Sultan Abdülhamid II had already become the subject of heated debate, 
not only among historians but also among journalists and politicians in Turkey. Those promoting 
the “official” historiography continued to vilify Sultan Abdülhamid II, while those who held a 
nostalgic view of the Ottoman Empire glorified his character and policies.41 This politically 
charged atmosphere motivated some scholars to present a more nuanced picture of Abdülhamid. 
In The Well-Protected Domains (1998), Selim Deringil attempted to rescue the Ottoman elite and 
the Sultan from their “Kemalist denigrators’’ and their “fans’’ on the political right wing.42 
Deringil provided a thorough study of power and ideology during the reign of Sultan 
Abdülhamid II and became one of the figures who pioneered the reinterpretation of policies 
pursued during his reign. Criticizing western historians who generally considered the great 
                                                 
40 This translation is taken from Selim Deringil’s Well-Protected Domains.  
41 Hanioğlu, “The Well-Protected Domains,’’ 319. 
42 Selim Deringil, The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 
1876-1909 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 2.  
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powers of Europe as the locomotive of change in the Ottoman Empire, Deringil instead 
underlined the internal dynamics that had often been ignored. Moreover, he challenged the 
dominant perspective among the western scholars who were likely to ascribe peculiarity and 
exoticism to the features and the conditions of the Ottoman Empire. Deringil argued that this 
perspective was also adopted by Turkish counterparts of the Western scholars, explaining it as 
follows: 
Among the Left, who blame the ancient regime for Turkey’s underdevelopment, it is 
fashionable to depict the past as a period when ‘pashas ate magnificent banquets while 
the people languished on olives’... Their (the pashas’) reforms were not ‘true’ reforms 
because they were not inspired by European ‘Enlightenment thinking’. ‘The Ottoman 
Empire was a different civilization with its unique characteristics.’ Not even Oriental but, 
‘stagnated’, it  became ‘Orientalized’ under the unyielding influence of 'the scholastic 
world view’. 
  
The Turkish Right, in contrast to the positions held by the Kemalists and the Left, basks 
in self-adulation and cherishes the illusion that the Ottoman state was somehow sui 
generis and cannot be compared to any other polity. Faith in Islam and the organizational 
genius of the “Turk” are self-completing and self-evident. These find a particular focus 
around the personality of Sultan Abdülhamid II who has become a political symbol of the 
Islamic Right.43 
 
 Adopting a novel perspective, Deringil finds Abdülhamid’s reign important due to its 
being “both formative and disruptive, both creative and destructive.’’44 For Deringil, the 
Hamidian era was formative precisely due to the long-term implications of a set of varied 
reforms undertaken during the Tanzimat era including education, railroads and military reform, 
irrigation works that marked the preliminary steps of an industrial, modern structure. These 
reforms “disrupted’’ the traditional fabric of society to a large extent as they meant a new form of 
governance with a new sovereign power, which required new strategies to rule over the 
population. In that regard, with the centralization efforts reaching a climax during the Hamidian 
                                                 
43 Deringil, The Well-protected Domains, 5. 
44 Ibid, 11. 
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era, the state, Deringil observes, came to ask “not passive obedience but conformity to a 
unilaterally proclaimed normative order.’’45 
 Contributing to Deringil’s observations on modernity and the Sultan’s reign, François 
Georgeon in fact argued that in certain respects, Abdülhamid’s rule became the harbinger of the 
20th and maybe even 21st century’s political regimes.46 Citing Abdülhamid’s effective use of 
censorship and monitoring subjects through a network of spies and informants, Georgeon argued 
in Abdülhamid II: Le Sultan Calife (2003) that the absolutist regime established by Abdülhamid 
II included modern components, the effects of which would later be felt more definitively by the 
subjects of modern states.47 In that regard, Georgeon underlined that though Abdülhamid’s reign 
might initially be considered strange and distant compared to the present, this was not actually 
the case since our contemporary anxieties were actually more similar than we generally 
accepted.48 Contrary to those who see a rupture between Abdülhamid and Atatürk, Georgeon 
argued that the former was the harbinger of the latter.49 There are also other scholars today who 
tend to emphasize the continuities rather than the disruptions between Abdülhamid and Atatürk 
by citing their respective governing strategies and practices.50  
 Contemporary historiographical works, both academic and popular, frequently depict 
Sultan Abdülhamid II as both a heroic leader of his time and a pious Muslim. Islam is argued to 
be the source of his courage and strength, which were needed under unfavorable circumstances. 
In accordance with this, it is suggested that Abdülhamid II deserves more respect compared to 
the other sultans as he knew how to sustain the state for thirty-three years not for the sake of the 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 François Georgeon, Abdülhamid II: Le Sultan Calife, 1876-1909 (Paris: Le Grand Livre Du Mois, 2003), 17. 
47 Georgeon, Le Sultan Calife, 509. 
48 Ibid, 17. 
49 Ibid, 509. 
50 See Eldem, “Sultan Abdülhamid II,” 25-29. 
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Ottomans but for all Muslims across the globe. Ibrahim Kalın, a historian and the current 
spokesman of the Presidency of Turkey, portrays Abdülhamid as an anti-imperialist who fought 
for the liberation of Muslims. In Ben, Öteki ve Ötesi: İslam-Batı İlişkileri Tarihine Giriş 
(2016), Kalın turns the official view of the early Republican era on its head by transforming 
Abdülhamid from an oppressor to a freedom fighter and a defender of Islam. Moreover, he 
argues that the pan-Islamist policies of the Hamidian era were pursued so as to fend off Europe's 
desire to colonize Muslim countries.51 The Sultan’s policies are reinterpreted as having aimed to 
prevent the colonization of Muslim countries by Russian and European imperialism and as 
having empowered Muslim societies by investing in education, transportation and trade.52 Hence, 
all the reforms carried out to centralize and modernize the state turn into deeds for an Islamic 
cause in the present, while the spread of modern schools across the empire and construction 
works such as the Hejaz railway are now recast as part of the efforts of Abdülhamid to reform, 
revive and empower Islam.  
 Moreover, Kalın ties the Sultan’s negative image in the West to his association with 
Islam. He argues that the European states were aware of the fact that Abdülhamid was trying to 
revive the caliphate against colonialism and this was the reason why they embarked on a series 
of media and social projects to prevent it.53 As a universal leader of Islam who initiated the idea 
of unifying all Muslims under his caliphate, Kalın underlines, Abdülhamid II was bound to be a 
dangerous political enemy in the eyes of Europeans.54 
 For the more popular images of Abdülhamid II that have been reshaping how people 
perceive the Sultan in present-day Turkey, I turn to “Derin Tarih’’, a popular history magazine 
                                                 
51 Ibrahim Kalın, Ben, öteki ve ötesi: İslâm-batı Ilişkileri Tarihine Giriş (Istanbul: Insan, 2017), 302. 
52 Kalın, Ben, öteki ve ötesi, 303. 
53 Ibid, 306. 
54 Ibid, 307. 
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published by a pro-government media outlet. This magazine is known for its ideological 
closeness to the AK Party. Published monthly since 2012, the magazine mostly focuses on 
Ottoman history by paying special attention to Sultan Abdülhamid II. It has featured the Sultan a 
total of seven times on its cover, making him by far the mostly covered sultan among those who 
reigned in the Ottoman Empire. The cover of Issue 11 (February 2013), for example, features 
Abdülhamid’s portrait alone.55 Commemorating the anniversary of his death, the magazine 
presents Abdülhamid through the eyes of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek by quoting his famous but 
obscure statement, which might be translated as “Understanding Abdülhamid is equivalent to 
understanding everything.’’ Interestingly, the next issue of the magazine (Issue 12, March 2013) 
covers Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on its first page. The cover picture shows Atatürk next to an 
image of a skull, casting the shadow of death over the founder of modern Turkey and 
annihilating his sanctity.56 Titled “Lectures on skull from Atatürk’’, this issue is about his visits to 
several schools in Anatolia during 1930-31 and his remarks on the early Republic’s research 
efforts on physical anthropology. In other issues of the magazine as well, iconic photographs of 
Atatürk, which have been generally used along with such positive words as “civilization’’ and 
“development of the nation’’ are instead seen to accompany negative words such as 
“dictatorship’’ and “barbarity’’, thereby negate his legacy. In that regard, the magazine 
rehabilitates Abdülhamid’s image as a revered ancestor of Turks in popular imagination while 
severely criticizing Atatürk’s leadership. 
 What is striking is that the magazine merges the past and the present unreservedly, 
constructing a decisive continuity between Sultan Abdülhamid II and the President Recep Tayyip 
                                                 
55 See Mustafa Armağan, “Atatürk’ten Kafatasi Dersleri,” Derin Tarih, March 2013, 
http://www.derintarih.com/sayilar/mart-2013/ (accessed March 29, 2019). 
56 See Mustafa Armağan, “Abdülhamid’i Anlamak Her Şeyi Anlamak Olacaktɪr,” Derin Tarih, February 2013, 
http://www.derintarih.com/sayilar/subat-2013/ (accessed March 29, 2019). 
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Erdoğan.57 On the one hand, this becomes instrumental in linking Abdülhamid to present-day 
Turkey, making him a relevant figure for the nation. On the other hand, it sets aside the period 
between Abdülhamid’s reign and the AK Party government. Dismissing the significance of 
secular regimes that have preceded the AK Party, the magazine collapses history at one stroke. 
The visual material on the cover of Issue 54 (September 2016) is a remarkable example of how 
“Derin Tarih’’ collapses history by directly linking Abdülhamid’s reign in the Ottoman Empire to 
the AK Party rule in Turkey, ignoring the interim period.58 Following the coup attempt against 
the government by a faction in the military in July 2016, the pictures of Sultan Abdülhamid II 
with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are its cover as the headline reads: Abdülhamid’s Resistance is New 
Turkey’s Resurrection. For the magazine, Abdülhamid II means resistance against the enemies of 
the Ottoman Empire, which is reduced to its Turkish and Islamic members in the present, 
disregarding its multi-ethnic and multi-confessional character. Those enemies are listed as the 
imperial powers of the West and their co-conspirators inside the country. In the past, Abdülhamid 
struggled against them as the narrative unfolds; however, he was played by them. In the present, 
the enemies of Turkey, as the continuation of the Ottoman Empire, are similar in character and 
aim. In such a picture, Erdoğan, who is imagined to be Abdülhamid’s successor comes to signify 
the resurrection of the same spirit which would initiate the resurrection of the state and the nation 
in line with Abdülhamid’s vision. As Erdoğan, the face of the nation, and Abdülhamid, the face 
of the Ottoman Empire, are linked together in the present, an attempt is made to establish 
continuity between the empire and contemporary Turkey in the public imagination.  
                                                 
57 This theme is repeated on many occasions. 
58 See Mustafa Armağan, “Abdülhamid’in Direnişi, Yeni Türkiye’nin Dirilişi,” Derin Tarih, September 2016, 
http://www.derintarih.com/sayilar/eylul-2016/ (accessed March 29, 2019). 
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 Moreover, collapsing history undermines the importance of circumstances in the past and 
in the present, presenting a narrative in which the actors as well as the time remain constant. In 
Issue 56 (August 2016), published right after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, Mustafa 
Armağan, the magazine’s editor-in-chief, draws a parallel between the events that ended with the 
deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid II by the Young Turks on May 27, 1909 and the coup attempt in 
the present. He argues that those who defended  the Sultan in order to reinstate absolute 
monarchy in the Ottoman Empire (against the Young Turks) more than a hundred years ago and 
those who took to the streets in order to prevent Erdoğan’s removal from power in 2016  were 
“in essence’’ the same. Citing the popular resistance against the soldiers on the night of the coup 
attempt, he states that:  
On the night of July 15, something happened to this nation. But what happened? Those 
children whose grandfathers were beaten and silenced on May 27, were back on the stage 
to take revenge...59  
 
 
As Esra Özyürek points out, the past becomes instrumental in understanding or controlling the 
present.60 In that regard, Abdülhamid’s reign is repeatedly presented as the key to understanding 
what is happening in the ever-changing present of Turkey. As the government has been facing a 
series of challenges recently, emanating from inside and outside of the country61, the past, as 
revised by the ruling elite today, is increasingly being presented as a reference point where 
people could find answers to their complicated questions. President Erdoğan supports this line of 
thought by claiming that the events that took place during Abdülhamid’s reign are repeated in 
                                                 
59 Mustafa Armağan, ‘’Yetişin Abdülhamid’i deviriyorlar,’’ Derin Tarih, August 2016, 
http://www.derintarih.com/kapak-dosyasi/yetisin-abdulhamidi-deviriyorlar/ (translations my own). 
60 Esra Özyürek, The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, 2011), introduction. 
61 To name a few: Popular anti-government protests known as Gezi Park protests, December 17 and December 25 
corruption allegations and consequent operations that targeted the close circle of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was 
the prime minister then, a string of terrorist attacks, the Syrian war, political contention with the US and Russia, 
dollar/TL crisis, and the economic crisis of 2018-2019. 
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Turkey today,62 implying that the western countries still conspire to weaken this country in the 
very same way that they targeted the Ottoman Empire when the Sultan was in power. In this 
picture, Abdülhamid is presented as more than a historical personality. He turns into a metaphor, 
“symbolizing the conviction that Turkey will rise again only if goes back to its essential 
values.’’63 Those essential values, according to Armağan, are based on Islam. More than a 
century later, after Abdülhamid tried to put the Ottoman Empire “on the right track’’ by unifying 
the empire under the banner of Islam,64 Turkey is seen as wanting to bring back those “essential 
values’’ under the AK Party rule and hence is claimed to face obstacles in this process. In that 
regard, two months after the coup attempt of July 15, Armağan suggests that Abdülhamid is the 
symbol of “revival’’ and those who are afraid of this “revival’’ blame and attack every attempt 
that would strengthen Turkey’s hand regionally and globally.65   
 To connect modern Turkey to its Ottoman past, Abdülhamid’s dates of birth and death, 
September 21 and February 10 respectively, are now nationally celebrated and commemorated. 
In 2018, the Presidency of Turkey organized a huge ceremony for the 100th anniversary of the 
death of the Sultan66 while “Derin Tarih’’ covered Abdülhamid in its February issues to pay 
respect to his legacy. In this coverage, what draws one’s attention is the fact that the language 
and metaphors used to eulogize him remind many of the images and words used to 
commemorate Atatürk. It is suggested that people of Turkey did not forget Abdülhamid even 
though a century passed after his death.67 I do not agree with this observation, but I would like to 
                                                 
62 President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made those remarks during a live interview with TRT, the state channel on April 
14, 2017. 
63 Mustafa Armağan, ‘’Sultan Abdülhamid Hakkında Yanlış Bildiğimiz 10 Şey,’’ Derin Tarih, October 2016, 
http://www.derintarih.com/yazarlar/sultan-abdulhamid-hakkinda-yanlis-bildigimiz-10-sey/ (translation my own). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 The ceremony will be discussed later in the thesis.   
67 Mustafa Armağan, ‘’Sultan Hamid’in Vefatı,’’ Derin Tarih, February 2018, http://www.derintarih.com/kapak-
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comment on it in order to demonstrate how the already familiar discourses and images, which 
have been generally used to commemorate Atatürk, are appropriated and given new meanings in 
the present. It is a well-known fact that Atatürk occupies the role of the unforgettable leader of 
Turks, who lives in people’s memories, for most of the population. What “Derin Tarih’’ attempts 
to do is to replace him with the Sultan. Moreover, Abdülhamid’s characterization of death as an 
“unhealing wound’’ shows a remarkable parallel to Atatürk’s portrayal of death as “eternal 
mourning.’’ 68 The following is an excerpt from “Derin Tarih’’, which appropriates popular 
memories from Atatürk’s funeral of 1938 and ascribes them to the funeral of Abdülhamid: 
Those women who saw the Sultan's coffin from their windows shouted in agony 
‘Where are you going, leaving us behind? (...) That day marked the end of an 
ancient era, so to say, the sun ceased to shine.’69 
 
It must be noted that the state-sponsored process of constructing Sultan Abdülhamid II as 
one of the most important leaders of Turkey seems to have found an audience in some parts of 
Turkish society. The revised legacy of Abdülhamid is now popularly consumed by a significant 
part of the society that demonstrates an increasing curiosity about the life and the reign of the 
Sultan. “Payitaht Abdülhamid’’70  [The Last Emperor] is among one of the most watched TV 
series in Turkey. Broadcast on the state’s channel TRT, “Payitaht Abdülhamid’’ portrays Sultan 
Abdülhamid II as a pious figure who struggled to keep the Ottoman Empire alive against all the 
odds. He symbolizes the power of Turks and the superiority of Islamic values. As the TV show 
invents the history about the Sultan on a popular level with each episode, what seems even more 
striking is the fact that it projects the present circumstances of Turkey onto the Hamidian period. 
                                                                                                                                                             
dosyasi/sultan-hamidin-vefati/. 
68 Nazlı Ökten, “An endless death and an eternal mourning,’’ in The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey ed. Esra 
Özyürek (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, 2011). 
69 Mustafa Armağan, “Sultan Hamid’in Vefatı,” Derin Tarih, February 2018, http://www.derintarih.com/kapak-
dosyasi/sultan-hamidin-vefati/ (translations my own). 
70 The series is titled “Payitaht Abdülhamid’’ in Turkish, “payitaht’’ meaning the capital city which might reveal the 
lack of knowledge of the Ottoman language in particular and the Ottoman Empire in general. 
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For example, as the economic crisis of 2019 was ripping through Turkey by creating a moderate 
discontent among the people, episode 78 (aired on March 15, 2019) showed Sultan Abdülhamid 
in consultation with his aides about the sharp increase in food prices in the Ottoman Empire. In 
this episode, the Sultan, who was seen to be outraged by his people’s suffering, explained that 
the source of the economic troubles was not the economy itself but international politics. He 
blamed the British Empire for the money shortage in the Ottoman market stating that “they are 
trying to discipline us with economy’’ as a reaction to his political decision on an internal matter. 
After this explanation the Sultan expressed his trust in his people’s “nobility’’ and advised them 
to “show restraint’’. Considering that the AK Party points to the political rift with the United 
States for the current economic drawdown in the country, this scene speaks directly to the people 
of Turkey, aiming to shape public opinion though an invented history.  
Not only the TV shows but also a number of popular history books on Sultan Abdülhamid 
II are flooding the market. Published within the past couple of years, each book highlights and 
valorizes a different aspect of the Sultan and his era, thus contributing to his creation as a 
mythical figure. I would like to share the titles of some of these books so as to give an idea of the 
existing diversity.71 Initially, I would like to focus on one of the most provocative books in this 
list, titled “Bir Mazlum Padisah: Sultan II. Abdülhamid’’ in Turkish, meaning An oppressed 
Sultan: Abdülhamid II. Written by Kadir Mısıroğlu, a writer and popular historian, who is known 
for his staunchly anti-Atatürk opinions, who wears a fez for the purpose of a public statement in 
his media appearances and who occasionally makes stirring comments such as “I wish the 
                                                 
71 The books recently been published on Abdülhamid are as follows; Wise Sultan Abdülhamid Khan written in 2018 
by Yasin Ӧzen; Deep Sultan written in 2017 by Űmit Doğan; Balance in Tradition and Modernity: Sultan 
Abdulhamid Khan written in 2018 by Necmettin Alkan; The Sultan of the Projects: Abdulhamid Khan written in 
2015 by Yusuf Güldür; A trust: My Grandfather Abdulhamid’s Palestine Case written by one of Abdülhamid’s actual 
grandsons Abdülhamid Kayihan Osmanoglu in 2018. 
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Greeks had won the war72, then the caliphate would have survived’’73, the book hijacks the 
Kemalist discourse when its writer defines Abdülhamid as a mazlum. Mazlum means in Turkish a 
person who is oppressed and subjected to injustice. As opposed to the literature that long treated 
Sultan Abdülhamid II as the source of oppression and injustice for his people, this metaphor of 
mazlum aims to win sympathy for the Sultan in the present, thus contributing to the process of 
restoring his public image. From this perspective, Abdülhamid’s authoritarian practices are 
presented as necessary for the survival of the state which was in danger at that time. Providing an 
excuse for Abdülhamid’s autocracy, Mısıroğlu cites the extraordinary circumstances that 
threatened the existence of the state then, implying that the Sultan was the sovereign of an 
empire situated in a state of emergency, a modern concept that justifies the suspension of law.  
 In his Mazlum, Mısıroğlu writes that the Sultan had to suffer all kinds of oppression and 
was subjected to denigration because it was not easy to detach people from what he calls an 
Islamic World View dating back hundreds of years.74 He criticizes the westernization process that 
started with the Tanzimat, calling it an “adventure which put Turkey under the tutelage of 
Europe’’.75 He underlines that Abdülhamid II became unrecognizable due to the orchestrated 
efforts to negate his legacy. Like Armağan, he rejects the historiography about the Sultan as a lie 
and argues that “the truth’’ about Abdülhamid II is still to be told. In fact, there is not a single 
truth when it comes to history but rather multiple perspectives that are conditioned by the 
present. What Mısıroğlu attempts to do is not to reveal “the truth”, which does not exist, but to 
actively construct one. 
                                                 
72 The war Mısıroğlu mentions here is the Turkish War of Liberation (1919-1923). 
73 “Kadir Mısıroğlu: Keşke Yunan Galip Gelseydi, Ne Hilafet Yıkılırdı, Ne şeriat,’’ Mynet, October 12, 2016, 
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III. Ottoman History Revised 
 
 As Edhem Eldem points out, history has been instrumental to the political and ideological 
goals of the ruling elite in Turkey,76 making the country’s immediate past, which is defined by 
the Ottoman Empire, “usable and abusable’’ to serve the needs of the time.77 When Turkey was 
founded as a republic following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World 
War I, the “official discourse’’ first chose to negate, then to neglect the Ottoman past. Such 
discursive politics was based on many reasons. The empire collapsed at the end of a process 
marked by war and violence due to western imperialism and the nationalist movements gaining 
momentum in different parts of the land. Moreover, it symbolized a different political, social and 
cultural formation to the one preferred for the young country by the Kemalist elite. The “new” 
Turkey, as it was named by policymakers inside and outside the country at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, was based on the ideals of a secular nation state, which principally required 
definitive borders and a homogeneous society. Having spanned three continents and six 
centuries, the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, meant a legacy of an “old’’ organization which 
stood in sharp contrast to the secular nation-state form, considering the former's complex 
socioeconomic systems and pluralistic societal arrangements, especially in the period before the 
nineteenth century.78  
 Furthermore, the experience of time, which then marked the present, made the alienation 
of the past convenient.79 During the first decades of the republic, the political elite that carved a 
                                                 
76 Eldem, “Sultan Abdülhamid II,’’ 25. 
77 Edhem Eldem, “Sultan Abdulhamid II: Founding Father of the Turkish State?” (lecture, Center for Middle Eastern 
Studies, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, March 23, 2018) https://www.international.ucla.edu/cnes/article/191085.  
78 Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries 
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Turkish nation and state out of the Ottoman Empire looked at the possibilities of a “novel’’ and 
“better’’ future which could only be achieved through a commitment to the ideal of “progress’’. 
Perceived as having ended in failure, their given past was loaded with experiences that were 
deemed to offer nothing but burden, preventing this newly formed nation from reaching the level 
of “contemporary civilizations’’.80 For those who were under the influence of the Enlightenment 
notions, the future was based on the otherness of the past. The difference between past and 
present could be the only indicator of change, a change that was desired, and the expected future 
“was so radical in its openness and unpredictability that it annulled the present utility of the past 
experience.’’81 Thus, the Ottoman past, though given and historical, was abandoned for the sake 
of pursuing a better possibility in the present and future, which was sought in the form of a 
nation-state. 
 The nation-state demanded its citizens selectively forget the past, or in Benedict 
Anderson’s terms adopt a “collective amnesia’’ 82 as well as collective memory. As the Ottoman 
past was forgotten in the nationalist discourse, an ancient past connecting the newly formed 
Turkish nation to its roots in Central Asia, was invented because the latter became more 
“relevant” than the former one.83 With the support of Atatürk, “The Turkish History Thesis’’ 
made Turks the creators of the world’s greatest civilizations84 imagining the Hittites and 
Sumerians as their ancestors. Zürcher underlines that this invented historical link to Hittites 
                                                 
80 This is a goal set by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkey and the contemporary civilizations are of 
Europe.  
81 John Zammito, “Koselleck’s Philosophy of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of History,” History and Theory 
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82 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
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served the purpose of securing Anatolia as a Turkish country “since time immemorial’’, thus 
relating the roots of the citizens of the republic to the territory they inhabited.85 
 In the process of nationalization, Turkish officials “disabled’’ the old ways of living in 
order to “enable’’ the emergence of new ones as part of the modernity project;86 a series of 
revolutionary cultural reforms was undertaken, which in part served to distance the young 
country from its Ottoman past. As Hale Yılmaz maintains, those reforms were carried out in a 
wide range of domains, changing from the abolition of the Caliphate to the adoption of the Latin 
alphabet and from abolishment of polygamy in Turkish civil law to the declaration of Sunday as 
the new day of rest.87 The newly founded republic was portrayed to be a rupture from the 
Ottoman past in every respect. A booklet, issued by the Directorate General of Press and 
Information in 1937 for the purpose of introducing the new Turkey to the world, might serve as a 
good example to reflect on how the official discourse defined Turkey's relationship with the 
Ottoman past. The booklet, which was called Turkey with Photographs, did not deny that the 
republic was “historically’’ related to the Ottoman Empire. However, it strongly rejected the 
existence of any continuity. This attitude was not unique to Turkey at that time. Other nation-
states that were founded on Ottoman lands also rejected any social, cultural or political 
continuities with the Ottoman Empire as part of their efforts to write their own national history 
narratives. In the case of Turkey, it was clearly stated in the booklet that “the states and the 
societies have nothing in common, indeed, the components of the Turkish Republic represent the 
exact opposite of those pertaining to the Ottoman Empire.’’88 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Talal Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization?” in Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in Honor of Stanley 
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 As every generation writes its own history at times of transformation,89 the interpretations 
of the Ottoman past have changed in academic and popular works accordingly. Following the 
academics’ and the writers’ lead, the politicians of Turkey have not hesitated to revisit their once 
neglected Ottoman past, each time to invent it in a different way that would demonstrate a strong 
connection with the present circumstances. When multi-party politics were introduced in the 
1950s, for example, the achievements of the Ottoman Empire, such as the conquest of Istanbul in 
1453, were integrated into nationalist history as an example for commemorating the past glories 
of the Turks.90 As Brockett points out, Turks and Ottomans were used interchangeably in this 
period, reducing the Ottoman Empire to a single national identity in popular imagination while 
neglecting its multi-ethnic/multi-religious character. After a period of political amnesia that 
marked the single-party period, from 1923 to 1945, this change may be regarded as a sign that 
the people no longer associated the Ottoman past with the negative memories of war and defeat. 
Furthermore, it may indicate that the fear of suppression by the state abated after the political 
transition to the multi-party era. Contrary to the 1950s, politically motivated imaginations of the 
Ottoman Empire were later marked by the empire’s multi-cultural and pluralistic character. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the circumstances inside and outside Turkey made the 
Ottoman past “relevant’’ to the present then, opening room for its reinterpretation as an imperial 
“liberal’’ setting in the past where different groups could peacefully co-exist, amid Turkey's 
efforts to economically and politically liberalize in the present. As Yılmaz Çolak points out, at 
that time, Turkey’s nationalistic and homogenizing structure was challenged by multiple social 
                                                 
89 I am thankful to Professor Abou-El-Haj for this insight. 
90 Gavin D. Brockett, “When Ottomans Become Turks: Commemorating the Conquest of Constantinople and Its 
Contribution to World History,’’ The American Historical Review 119, no. 2 (2014): 414-419.  
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groups in Turkey who demanded recognition of their distinct identity.91 This period was marked 
by the rise of the separatist Kurdish movement, the Islamist groups and the Alevis. This was also 
coupled with the tumultuous developments in the Balkans during the 1990s, especially the 
persecution of Muslims through ethnic strife. In such an atmosphere, Turgut Özal (the Prime 
Minister between 1983 and 1989 and President between 1989 and 1993) began to use Turkey's 
Ottoman legacy for resolving internal socio-cultural tensions that resulted from cultural diversity 
as well as for shaping Turkish foreign policies, especially concerning the Balkans.92 For Özal, 
the Ottoman perspective with its multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-national structure 
provides a suitable model for the Balkans, where ethnic conflict continued to dominate daily life 
and for Turkey facing ethnic (Kurdish) separatism.93 Those notions were promoted in “Türkiye 
Günlüğü’’, (an Ankara-based, right-wing monthly journal) by liberal writers such as Cengiz 
Çandar. The Ottoman Empire became the source of a political vision with the premises of “free 
enterprise, human rights and cultural and ethnic pluralism.’’94 However, this reinterpretation of 
the Ottoman Empire remained limited within political and intellectual circles; it did not 
effectively diffuse into the public sphere.95 Around the same time, political Islamists transformed 
this liberal imagination of the Ottoman Empire, emphasizing first and foremost its Islamic 
character. 
 Selectively choosing from among the previous representations of the Ottoman Empire, 
the AK Party, during its long rule of seventeen years so far, has reconstructed the Ottoman past 
several times in line with the changing needs or atmosphere of the living present. Yet, this 
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ambiguity has recently been displaced in favor of a more rigid and absolute picture about the 
meaning of this period in Turkey’s history. Different from the previous political parties, which 
have repurposed the Ottoman past for their political goals, the AK Party is successful at 
disseminating its invention to the masses as the single “truth’’ about the Ottoman Empire. 
 The AK Party reconstructs the country as the continuity of the Ottoman Empire in the 
public imagination, actively reminding people of a legacy marked by its Islamic and Turkish 
character. There are academic works which conceive this as “a deliberate political project’’, 96 
aimed at reviving the Ottoman past in a variety of domains, changing from urban fabric to 
foreign policy. I find the notion of reviving the past problematic as the past could only acquire 
new meaning in the present but could never be revived. I partly agree with this argument because 
it is my contention that the state rebuilds the collective memory pertaining to the Ottoman 
Empire to set a new goal for society. This goal is to redefine who Turks are on the basis of 
religious identity, i.e. Islam, and their difference from Europe/the West, marking a shift from the 
Kemalist vision. As Fatma Müge Göçek observes, Turkey’s membership process in the European 
Union plays a significant role in this shift, making the shortcomings of the Republic more 
visible.97 The criticisms of the European Union, which constantly define what Turkey lacks vis-
à-vis European standards facilitates “a nostalgic turn to the past’’.98 As people come to identify 
themselves as “grandchildren of the Ottomans, their identity gains more of a historical character. 
According to a group of scholars, what unfolds in Turkey is a process of reconstruction of the 
nation (a process of re-nationhood),99 and establishment of a new sense of unity on the basis of 
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the Ottoman past is an integral part of it. However, it must be noted that this recently embraced 
historical identity also provides scope for the people of Turkey to surpass the barriers set by 
national borders and associate themselves with other national groups who once shared a common 
history under the rule of the Ottomans. Though I recognize the current state initiative as a project 
due to its systematic character serving a goal, I find it important to note that the Ottoman past in 
question is given and historical; it does not come out of the indigenous experience. Moreover, 
there has always been a popular curiosity about the Ottoman past which became more prominent 
following the democratization of the political regime with the introduction of multi-party politics 
and the expansion of a competitive printing culture throughout the 1950s.100 The AK Party 
shapes and leads this popular interest effectively, disseminating the single “truth’’ about it to the 
masses.  
 There is a symbiotic relationship between the recent rising popular interest in the 
Ottoman Empire (Sultan Abdülhamid II in particular) and the policies of the government. The 
more people embrace their Ottoman past, the more the AK Party incorporates symbols or 
concepts from the Ottoman Empire into their daily politics, giving them new meanings in the 
present. Similarly, as the state (embodied by the AK Party) invokes the Ottoman past, it turns it 
into an appealing object. This creates a popular desire to own a piece from the past marked by 
the Ottomans. Thus, the elements of Ottoman heritage turns into commodities in various sectors 
(from television to home décor) as Turkish entrepreneurs invent and sell different experiences of 
an overly exoticized empire. For example, Nilhan Osmanoğlu, Abdülhamid’s great grand-
daughter, who created a brand based on the Ottoman dynasty, sells the perfumes of the sultans, 
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the replicas of the coffee cups that they used, the rosaries and even costumes of the sultans via a 
commercial website called sultandan.com. She speaks at the conferences held by municipalities, 
giving talks about Abdülhamid, his great grand-father whom she has never seen. She vocally 
supports the AK Party and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, often arguing that President Erdoğan’s 
enemies in the present are the same as Abdülhamid's. 101  
 In this atmosphere where political, popular and economic interests intersect, Abdülhamid 
increasingly becomes the face of the Ottoman Empire, overshadowing the other sultans 
commonly recognized as “legendary’’, such as Mehmed the Conqueror, who conquered Istanbul, 
leading to the end of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, or Suleiman the Magnificent, who presided 
over the apex of the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century. There might be multiple 
reasons for that change. First of all, Abdülhamid II is a more contemporary figure who reigned 
for thirty-three years just before the foundation of Turkey. Maybe more importantly, as I have 
elaborated above, he has historically been revered by the conservatives and Islamists in the 
country because of his pan-Islamist policies, and his struggle with the Young Turks who 
eventually defined the main precepts of the Republic of Turkey -mainly secularism, nationalism, 
and republicanism - after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, setting the goal of 
Europeanization in order not to fall prey to European expansionism. Different from the vision of 
the Young Turks, the Ottoman Empire, which has increasingly been represented by the figure of 
Abdülhamid, represents an alternative vision for Turkey, based on Islam and Islamic unity, 
historically making him a symbol for those who criticized the cultural revolution of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk. In the 1990s, for example, when the Welfare Party, which is the Islamic party 
                                                 
101 “2. Abdülhamid’in Torunu Nilhan Osmanoğlu: Dedemin Ve Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın Düşmanları Aynı,’’ 
Sabah, February 12, 2017, https://www.sabah.com.tr/fotohaber/magazin/-abdulhamidin-torunu-nilhan-osmanoglu-
dedemin-ve-cumhurbaskani-erdoganin-dusmanlari-ayni (accessed March 31, 2019).  
29 
 
founded by Necmettin Erbakan, who comes from the National Outlook movement that would 
eventually give rise to the AK Party, won the municipality elections in big cities including 
Istanbul and Ankara, such political victories played the most crucial role in popularizing the 
Ottoman legacy, setting out to create a civilizational alternative to the ideals of Kemalist 
westernization.102 Welfare Party mayors, including the Istanbul mayor at the time, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, organized alternative commemorations to offer a new manifestation of the Islamo-
Ottoman national identity as opposed to the existing secular-ethnic Turkish identity.103 These 
newly elected mayors used the ceremonies conducted for the celebration of the conquest of 
Istanbul by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed to manifest their opposition to the Kemalist 
establishment. However, it is important to underline that until the 1990s, the Ottoman conquest 
of Istanbul had already been rehabilitated by previous governments as a glory of the “Turkish 
nation’’, being ripped out of its imperial context. The Welfare Party municipalities followed the 
path which had already been made available to them, at the same time changing the content. 
When they celebrated the conquest of Istanbul, they glorified not only a Turkish but also an 
Islamic past.  
 Since the AK Party came to power in 2002, the Ottoman Empire has ceased to be the 
language of the opposition, and has moved to the center. As the Ottoman Empire gained more 
visibility in the public space, the party's emphasis on Sultan Abdülhamid II has become more 
prominent within the past five years, especially during and after the Gezi Park protests in 2013. 
In that regard, the high dose of symbolism coming from the top of the state even makes scholars 
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ask whether Abdülhamid is the founding father of the Turkish state.104 Sharing an anecdote from 
his archival research experience in Turkey, for example, Eldem brings the new design of the CDs 
to our attention, which include archival material pertaining to the Ottoman Empire. Issued by the 
Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) the CDs, Eldem demonstrates, 
have Abdülhamid’s tughra imprinted on them. This novelty, Eldem argues, signals an intention to 
mimic the use that Kemalism made of Atatürk’s famous signature, “K. Atatürk.”105  Rather, I 
argue that the tughra on the CDs symbolizes the long history of the Ottoman Empire, which 
spanned six centuries, and its official commemoration in the figure of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the 
sultan imagined the Islamic leader of an Islamic empire.   
Consolidating its power after each election victory and discarding its competitors within 
the bureaucracy and military, the AK party is increasingly embodying the state, producing 
policies, including cultural ones that address the Ottoman Empire and Sultan Abdülhamid II. The 
emerging literature, which has constructed Turkey as the continuity of the Ottoman Empire 
contrary to the official discourse taken up during the early republic, while saving Sultan 
Abdülhamid II from being the “other’’ of the regime since the 1960s, dominates the language of 
the state/government today. 
 TV series, books, conferences, exhibitions, commemoration ceremonies, which are 
sponsored by the state, remind the nation of its past associated with the Ottoman Empire and 
Sultan Abdülhamid II, fanning popular interest in the past further marked by the Ottomans’ glory 
and grandiosity. Following a populist policy, the AK Party catches the increasing interest of the 
masses in their Ottoman past in general and Abdülhamid in particular, and attempts to define 
their meanings. In other words, any representation of the Ottoman Empire does not seem to be 
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acceptable for the state as it exerts an active effort to guide the people in their exhumation of 
their past. For example, in 2012, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then the prime minister, severely 
criticized a popular soap opera called “Magnificent Century’’ for how Sultan Suleiman of the 
sixteenth century was portrayed on TV, arguing that Suleiman had been a proud conqueror rather 
than the indulgent harem lover portrayed in the show. 106 Attracting an audience of up to 150 
million people in Turkey as well as parts of the Balkans and Middle East, the show was given a 
warning by the prime minister who called on the judiciary to act. In fact, the Ottoman Empire 
has become sacred.107 While Erdoğan dismissed this soap opera as unacceptable, he 
recommended another one in 2017, “Payitaht Abdülhamid’’, telling the youth that if they want to 
learn their history, they should watch it.108 Broadcast on the state's channel TRT, “Payitaht 
Abdülhamid’’ is about how Sultan Abdülhamid II, a pious figure, struggled to keep the Ottoman 
Empire alive against all odds. Among many other features, Abdülhamid is represented as a 
symbolic figure of the power of Turks and Islamic piety.  
 The state in Turkey indoctrinates the nation into their new identity109 which is marked by 
being Muslim and the “grandchildren of the Ottomans’’ who ruled over the world once, with a 
number of practices including the state sponsored ceremonies. As the ceremonies are 
instrumental in constructing the collective memory of a nation, the early republic did not 
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commemorate the dates pertaining to the birth or the death of the Ottoman sultans. This 
symbolized a part of history that the republic would rather forget. In the present, however, the 
state sponsors events reminiscent of the significance of the Ottoman Empire and Sultan 
Abdülhamid II in particular. These events turn into occasions where politicians guide the 
population through history, producing a new discourse on the nation's past. One of the recent 
occasions where this new discourse has been adopted and promoted by the state, pertaining to 
Turkey's Ottoman past and to Sultan Abdülhamid II, is a commemoration ceremony marking the 
centenary of the death of the Sultan. Organized by the Presidency of Turkey on February 10, 
2018, the ceremony was covered by both the national and international press, attracting wide 
attention. For the event, it was argued that the Sultan was officially declared a “hero’’ in 
Turkey.’’110 Addressing the crowd at the ceremony, President Erdoğan re-constructed 
Abdülhamid as a legendary leader of Turks. He opened his speech by quoting from Necip Fazıl 
Kısakürek, the writer of The Great Khan Abdülhamid in the 1960s, saying that the Sultan “was 
maybe the greatest among 36 Turkish leaders in history’’, and underlining that “understanding 
Abdülhamid is to understand everything.’’111 In Erdoğan’s speech, Abdülhamid was 
commemorated as the last emperor of the world, who reigned during the most difficult and 
burdensome years of the Ottoman Empire. Maybe that’s why he deserved a special place among 
the other sultans. However, the speech went on, Abdülhamid II was neglected and even 
denigrated for a long period of time in Turkey’s history. According to President Erdoğan’s 
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speech, he was one of the biggest victims of ideological polarization which had held Turkish 
intellectual life hostage.  
Self-recognizing that “history is not only the past of a nation; but also the compass for its 
future’’, President Erdoğan refreshed the memory of the nation on Abdülhamid. As he stated, 
history consisted of what is remembered by the people. With that, he provided a short summary 
of the imminent republican past: 
Sultan Abdülhamid was once officially understood in Turkey from the eyes of his 
enemies and competitors (abroad). He was even called Red Sultan in school books. For 
most of the intellectuals, writers, academics, and politicians in this country, he is the 
leader of a so-called absolute rule. For some politicians, he is the opposite of Ghazi 
Mustafa Kemal, the other of the Republic. Insulting Sultan Abdülhamid and ignoring his 
legacy became an instrument for pledging allegiance to the Republic.  
 
Apart from the fact that these notions were officially recognized for the first time, what is 
striking is their similarity to the historical revisions in academic literature that I discussed 
previously. On similar lines, Erdoğan criticized those who still try to start the history of Turkey at 
1923. According to him, the continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey 
represented the nations’ authentic “roots and values’’. Erdoğan claims that those roots and values 
belong to “us’’ and they are defined by Islam, making Abdülhamid, significant and “relevant’’ in 
the present. In that regard, Erdoğan stated: 
Against all the negative campaigns about him, Sultan Abdülhamid continues to be 
remembered as the Great Hakan. The Turkish nation remembers him with his following 
words: We are not sick. We are like a river, flowing over its banks. All we need to do is to 








III. Reconstructing the self-image of Turkey 
 The Ottoman theme recurs in the ambitious construction projects which have come to 
define the rule of the AK Party. Boosting pride in the past, those projects tend to reconstruct the 
image of Turkey as a continuity of the Ottoman Empire. Actively transforming the public space, 
they aim to remind both the internal and external audience that the people of Turkey, 
characterized as Muslims first, own the legacy of the Ottomans in today’s world. This process 
serves the present needs and goals of the political elite by bringing out different fragments of the 
past. For example, the grandiose construction projects are designed to make Istanbul a global 
center again as the city is remembered by the political elite to have once been the imperial capital 
or “a cultural and political Mecca” for Muslims in Keyder’s words.113 While at the same time, 
these projects have become the marker for the reunification of the Muslim communities under 
the leadership of Turkey, which is indicative of another fragment from the past. Acting as a 
reminder that the Ottoman Empire, especially during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, unified 
the Muslims when western imperialism was rampant, this fragment constitutes the foundation of 
Turkey’s present aspiration to take the lead in the rising power of the oppressed. As a case study, 
I turn to Istanbul’s new airport, believing that this ambitious construction project reflects the 
notions that have been presented in this thesis. 
 Istanbul's third and newest airport is the jewel in the crown of the grandiose construction 
projects that have been undertaken by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Turkey, and his 
Justice and Development Party (AK Party) which has been ruling the country since 2002. A giant 
project worth 11.7 billion dollars114, it aims to be the biggest and busiest airport in the world,115 
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vying to become the center of world aviation. Once completed, it will be scattered over a huge 
area of 76.5 million square meters116, having a capacity to serve up to 200 million passengers 
annually.117 In a couple of years, it is suggested that the economic value created by airport-
related activities will correspond to 4.89% of the country’s GDP. 118 Succinctly, in many respects, 
the airport is Turkey’s new gate opening towards the world, as officials announced, holding a 
symbolic significance.  
 Presented as the masterpiece of President Erdoğan’s construction projects so far, the 
airport was opened with a glamorous ceremony on October 29, 2018 - a symbolic day for the 
country to commemorate the 95th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic after the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. An official commercial aired at the ceremony 
introduced the new airport to the public as a “monument to victory’’,119 gained against Turkey’s 
adversaries both home and abroad.120 The commercial, in which Turkey was once again 
reconstructed as a bridge connecting the East and the West, flattered the national pride of the 
country that was hurt by the dissolving of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, and 
later by the de facto failure of the membership negotiations with the European Union. The new 
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airport was part of a process in which the country would revive its golden past, symbolized 
mostly by the Ottoman Empire. Having such undertones the commercial announced: The world’s 
biggest airport does now belong to us. 
 What constituted “us’’, in other words the Turks, mentioned in the commercial, 
transformed during AK Party rule, attaining more of a historical character, rather than the legal-
constitutional one, especially with the increasing emphasis on Turks being the “grandchildren of 
the Ottomans’’. This newly constructed identity is based on a shared history of the Ottoman 
Empire, which is characterized in terms of Sunni-Islamic precepts. On the one hand, it 
increasingly becomes the glue of this imagined community called “Turkish’’ in the present, 
serving the AK Party’s goals to reconstruct Turkish society based on Sunni-Islamic precepts. On 
the other hand, it easily extends beyond the borders set by the nation-state, allowing Turks to 
connect with those who once shared a common Ottoman past and culture 121 but now hold 
different nationalities.  
 This historical identity vision challenges its early republican version which established 
Turkey as a modern, secular nation-state with a homogeneous society after the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire. The new social and political order (the nation-state) adopted by the political 
elite of the early Republican period was in total rivalry with the social and political order of the 
Ottoman Empire which endured till the nineteenth century.122 Thus, the immediate Ottoman past 
was rejected as being alien. Similar to the change of calendar in France after the 
French Revolution of 1789, Republican Turkey started its history with itself in the revolution of 
1923, severing its ties to the Ottoman Empire.  
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After almost a century, the AK Party seems to have captured the popular interest of the 
Turkish society in its Ottoman past, which has been politically visible since at least the 1990s, 
and it has been determined to promote it even further. The party is reconstructing a particular 
Ottoman imaginary in order to reshape current Turkey’s collective memory. This process requires 
a redefinition of self and it implies the reconstruction of the “other’’ too.   
It is possible to discern the reflections of this Ottomanist vision in the giant construction 
projects that have transformed the public space and infrastructure in Turkey, educating its 
inhabitants about their new “historical” identity. For example, the architectural design of the new 
airport is reported to be inspired by the cultural heritage of Istanbul, once the capital of the 
Ottoman Empire, with an emphasis on its Islamic and Ottoman character. Picture number 1 
shows the air control tower of the new airport in a one-page New York Times advert, which 
introduced the project to the international audience.123 The award-winning tower is designed in 
the shape of a tulip, which has been the symbol of Istanbul for many centuries, and is an 
important cultural reference in Turkish-Islamic history.124 Not only the air control tower, but also 
the ceiling of the passenger terminals constructed in the shape of a dome signifies the old history 
of Istanbul, i.e. mosques, hamams, and other Islamic architecture125 inherited from the Ottoman 
Empire. With these architectural features, the new airport of Istanbul is a microcosm of the 
efforts of the AK Party to represent Turkey as historically Ottoman, and to reconstruct its history 
as the flagship of a united Islamic civilization. 
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 This redefinition of Turkey, nonetheless, envisages a world of two civilizations. It 
emphasizes an affinity with the Muslims in general, but also differentiates this constructed unity 
from its western counterpart. In that regard, it symbolizes a sense of belonging for a wider 
Islamic/Ottoman civilization, differing from its earlier vision carved out by the early Republican 
elite which considered Europe as the one and only civilization.  
 The project’s “civilizational’’ aspect was revealed by President Erdoğan in his speech at 
the opening ceremony of the airport. Reflecting his goal to make Turkey again one of the centers 
of the world as the Ottoman Empire once used to be, he abandoned the language of “catching up 
with Europe”, the goal of Turkey since the foundation of the Republic, claiming instead that 
Europe would have to adjust itself to Turkey: 
 
With its architecture, construction, operation, and finance; the Istanbul Airport is a project 
that will set an example for the world. When the airport starts to operate, Europe will 
need to restructure its airspace... The fact that this monument, which will leave its mark 
on history with its location and features, was constructed in our country is no 
coincidence.126 
 
The officials represented Turkey as “the hope of those who were oppressed’’ across the region 
and the world via empowering projects like the new airport of Istanbul, which indeed attempted 
to defy the established order. These projects became instrumental in making a public statement 
with regard to Turkey’s aspiration to assume the leadership of the East, which had been 
dominated by the West following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.127   
 Though the Ottoman past has been revised by the AK Party for purposes and conditions 
marked present, it is not remembered fondly by others who believe that references to the empire 
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undermine the founding principles of Turkey, such as nationalism and secularism. The AK 
Party’s views about the country’s Ottoman past are especially contested. That past is not shared 
by those who wanted to sever the country’s relations with the Ottoman Empire, which was 
fundamental to the making of modern Turkey. In that regard, the fact that the AK Party attempts 
to commemorate the Ottoman past in the multi-billion dollar projects triggers a public 
controversy, in which the past becomes the site of a political contestation for the present and the 
anticipated future of the country. The name debate for the new airport, which is being articulated 
in terms of competing claims of the historical origin of the nation and whether Sultan 
Abdülhamid II had a role in its making reflects a fragment of this struggle. 
 The weeks preceding the opening ceremony witnessed several heated discussions over 
the name of the new airport that was to replace the Atatürk Airport, which itself was a product of 
the modernizing project of the republic and had operated internationally since 1953. Some 
claimed that such a grandiose project to represent Turkey on the international stage should be 
named after “Atatürk’’ as well. The official name of the new airport was kept secret until the day 
it was opened to the public. President Erdoğan already hinted in his past remarks that the new 
airport would not be named after the founder of the nation.128 Later, when a journalist close to 
the AK Party announced that the new airport would “certainly” be named after Sultan 
Abdülhamid II, whom President Erdoğan frequently evokes, many took her claim seriously, 
starting a debate on Turkey’s Ottoman past. One of the last sultans of the Empire, Abdülhamid II 
was historically revered by the conservatives, political Islamists and ultra-nationalists of Turkey. 
He is remembered for his pan-Islamist policies in the late Ottoman Empire, piety as well as 
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rejection of the Zionist movement to colonize Palestine. His era is viewed to be the last one in 
which Muslims could hold their dignity vis-à-vis the West. 129 
 Suggestions for naming the new airport after Sultan Abdülhamid were not new. Picture 4 
demonstrates Islamist “Hüküm” [Judgment] Magazine, aiming for the revival of the caliphate, 
which made a headline of it as early as 2015. Being proud of its past, the magazine’s cover also 
reunifies the Muslim community on Abdülhamid. It wrote: 
 
If the political consciousness that could sustain a failing state for 33 years returns, the 
most  important obstacles in front of the Islamic union/caliphate will be removed. The 
values that we lost with the loss of Abdülhamid will return to our world... The fact that 
One Minute130 is attracted great attention on the part of the umma without being subjected 
to any questions of sincerity, we should know that, it is directly about the inheritance of 
Abdülhamid. As the umma loves us with Abdülhamid, his name should be written to such 
a place that would make every Muslim coming to this territory feel the joy of coming to 
his country. If the newest name of the airport in Istanbul is named as Abdülhamid, every 
Muslim landing in Istanbul bears the conscience of coming the center of the caliphate 
while those leaving Istanbul bears the sadness in their faces.131 
 
 
 For those who cherish the legacy of Atatürk, the founder of Turkey, the name of Sultan 
Abdülhamid was one of controversy. As a columnist simply put it, they wished that it (the rumor 
that the new airport would be named Abdülhamid) were not true because “naming such a grand 
project like the new airport after that sultan” they believed “would shake Turkey to its core”.132 
Another columnist made clear what the name Abdülhamid meant for them by questioning: 
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How could they (the AKP) give the names of those who were against the Republic to the 
monuments of the Republic? We think that if the name of Abdülhamid or some other 
similar person is given to the airport, all of society should resist that. It is a national and 
vital duty to struggle against a mentality that detaches us from the civilized world, and 
makes us ignorant and poor in the name of religion.133 
 
 This vision of the Ottoman past which reflects a continuity with the ‘’official’’ history 
established by the early republican elite, suggests that Turkey constitutes a break with the 
Ottoman era. However, this notion is challenged by the AK Party supporters. A pro-government 
journalist demonstrates that he embraces President Erdoğan’s revision of history and argues that 
the Kemalists in today’s Turkey are indeed Unionists (İttihatçılar) of the Ottoman Empie, 
establishing an ahistorical link between the Committee of Union and Progress that ended Sultan 
Abdülhamid’s rule in 1908 and those who hold opposing views against Erdoğan. He suggests 
that if the airport is named after the sultan, ‘’the unionists will raise a hell out of it because an 
essential revenge will be taken on them.’’ 134 
 The public discussion on the Ottoman history and Sultan Abdülhamid II made clear the 
fault lines in the society by revealing the contending visions of the past hold by different groups. 
Raised a few days before the opening ceremony of the airport and continued almost 
simultaneously with the workers’ rebellion who protested the unfavorable working conditions at 
the construction site of the airport135, the claim that the airport would be called Abdülhamid 
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helped taking the pulse of the society. As Abdülhamid was still a divisive figure, the government 
opted for a non-contentious name for the airport by simply calling it ‘’Istanbul.’’   
There are other construction projects that have brought about Turkey’s Ottoman past into 
discussion. One of the grandiose construction projects that has been undertaken by the governing 
AK Party for Istanbul, ‘’Marmaray’’ is one of them. It is a railway tunnel which connects the two 
sides of the city underneath the Bosphorus strait. An ambitious engineering project, 76.3 km long 
sub-sea tunnel has a symbolic importance of being the first rail link between Europe and Asia, 
yet again consolidating Turkey’s role as a bridge between the continents. Indeed, ‘’Marmaray’’ is 
an integral part of a much longer rail way, providing uninterrupted transportation from London to 
Beijing and visa-verse for both passengers and freight. This rail way is dubbed as the ‘’Iron Silk 
Road‘’ by the ruling elite in Turkey in a reference to the ancient Silk Road - a trade route once 
linked China with the West, carrying goods and ideas between the two great civilizations of 
Rome and China.136 
Constructed with the financial and technical support of Japan, ‘’Marmaray’’ began to 
operate on October 29, 2013, a symbolic date which marked the 90th anniversary of the 
foundation of Turkey as a republic after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Attracting local 
and international attention, the opening ceremony of ‘’Marmaray’’ turned into a spectacle of 
power for the AK Party, which had been shaken by the anti-government Gezi protests only a 
couple months before the ceremony. Broadcast live on almost all the national as well as the 
international new channels including BBC and CNN, the ceremony gave Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
                                                 
136 ‘’Silk Road,’’ Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Silk-Road-trade-route (accessed March 
10, 2019).  
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then Prime Minister, an important moment to demonstrate ‘’Turkey’s renewed encouragement‘’ 
on the world stage.137 
 What stroke me most about this project was the portrayal of ‘’Marmaray’’ as a historical 
product. It was introduced to national and international public as 150 years old dream of 
Ottoman Sultans.138 The ticket issued for the occasion read ‘’a dream (of our ancestors) was 
realized‘’. As the ticket suggested, the AK Party branded itself as a power that honored the 
sultans’ project, constructing the party’s mission as fulfillment of uncompleted projects of the 
Ottomans. Speaking at the ceremony, Erdoğan extended his gratitude to the Ottoman sultans, 
including Sultan Abdülhamid II. The theme of historical continuity with the Ottoman Empire 
was repeated on numerous occasions.139 In each case, President Erdoğan was either identified 
with the sultan or attributed an ancestral lineage with him. The language of continuity was 
spotted during the debate which was triggered by the government’s plan to re-construct a 
nineteenth century Ottoman Military Barracks (Topçu Kışlası) in Taksim square, the center of 
Istanbul. Criticizing Gezi protestors, Erdoğan’s son stated that “You managed to devour 
Abdülhamid, but we will not let you devour Erdoğan.’’140  
IV. Conclusion 
Taking the present popularity of Turkey’s once neglected Ottoman past as its point of 
departure, this thesis attempts to understand how the scholarly and popular historiography with 
regard to the Ottoman Empire has been revised in Turkey in times of political and social 
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transformation. I argue that since the foundation of the Republic, the Ottoman past has been 
instrumental for political purposes always conditioned by the present. As each generation writes 
or invents its own history of the Ottoman past, the state and society in Turkey have been shaped 
based on an Ottoman imaginary that reflects the circumstances and goals of the day. As such, the 
Ottoman Empire was imagined (by the political elite) to be the ultimate “other” during the early 
republican period when Turkey was established based on a vision that promoted the formation of 
a staunchly secular, modern nation-state. To the contrary, it has recently come to be reimagined 
as the symbol of an authentic “self” for contemporary Turkey in the process of the reconstruction 
of the nation in a continuous dialogue with its Islamic past and possible futures. 
As Reinhart Koselleck argues in Futures Past, “time is no longer simply the medium in 
which all histories take place; it gains a historical quality.’’141 Furthermore, he attracts attention 
that “history no longer occurs in, but through time’’ while “time becomes a dynamic and 
historical force in its own right.”142 Following this line of argument and in particular Koselleck’s 
notion of historical time(s) for this thesis, I underline that temporality should be taken into 
account for understanding the changing views of the Ottoman past in Turkey. With reference to 
Koselleck, who argues that the experience of time by people has not been constant but subjected 
to transformation throughout history, I suggest that time, thus history was understood differently 
by the early republican elite that then stood at the juncture of a critical socio-political 
transformation. In this light, I claim that for them, the experience of present time, as linear and 
progressive, made the alienation of the immediate past necessary, hence the Ottoman past was 
negated. Similarly, I argue that the recent interest in the Ottoman past by the political elite is 
partly due to a shift in the experience of present time, as in motion but not necessarily in 
                                                 




progress. It is my contention that in the present, the unknown future is no longer privileged 
unconditionally over against the past which contributes to the reinterpretation of the Ottoman 
past not as a liability but as an asset.  
However, the current representations of the Ottoman Empire in politics and popular 
culture are far from being nuanced analysis of history. They are populist, ahistorical and in some 
cases manipulative. Still, I find them important as they signify the formation of a new historical 
consciousness in Turkey which ultimately revises the definition of the self. Today, a 
considerable part of the society recognizes themselves as “the grandchildren of the Ottomans” 
while the notion of a shared Ottoman past, which is remembered to have been solely Islamic and 
Turkish rather than multi-cultural, becomes the glue of this imagined community. As the last 
word, I would like to oppose those who interpret the increasing popularity of the Ottoman 
Empire in today’s Turkey as an attempt of the ruling elites to revive the Ottoman past. The past 
can never be revived but acquire new meanings in the present. What the ruling elites actively do 
is to appropriate fragments of and from the past for the convenience of them in order to define 
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